The Great Wall Around China
Following on from the last post...
There's a lot of debate from people saying that any attempt to 'contain' China is dangerous and counterproductive. In order to understand what the hell they're talking about, you have to ask what they mean by 'contain'.
Currently, there's a lot of criticism of US government policy to shore up military relations with Japan and India in particular, as well as strengthening various regional Asian relationships. The current US government's critics, predictably, accuse it of saber-rattling (do sabers rattle? Do cutlasses squeak?) Never mind that China has lined up missile batteries opposite Taiwan and periodically threatens to blow them all to hell if they don't vote for the right candidate in Taiwanese elections (oh if only China would have one of those...) once again all bad behavior of foreigners becomes America's fault, because that's more politically correct than blaming 1.3 billion Chinese for anything.
Firstly, I think the accusation of containment is silly, because it assumes that foreign policy is a zero-sum game. Maybe it was a hundred years ago, but in the era of globalisation, there's no longer any such thing. Military balance, or equilibrium, is not 'containment'. It's merely the warning of serious consequences for aggressive action. So far it's worked extremely well, and has in fact encouraged China to tone down its rhetoric significantly over Taiwan, for the simple reason that the Chinese leadership have been forced to realise that Taiwan plus America is a war they can't win. Yet.
There's plenty of South East Asian nations who are also quite pleased to be beneath America's security umbrella, where China is concerned. Some unlikely ones too, like Vietnam, who distrust China even more than China distrusts them. In fact, relations aren't real cozy all around the South China Sea, despite frequent plaudits for China's autocrats in the western media, lauding them for being so civiilised for not having killed anyone lately... a bit like patting Hannibal Lecter on the head and saying 'isn't Hannibal a good boy, he hasn't eaten ANYONE for weeks!'
So okay, that's overdoing it. But I liked the imagery.
The point is that much of the Chinese leadership's present pragmatism isn't praiseworthy enlightenment, it's simply that America called China's bluff, forcing the Chinese to realise that their emperor really didn't have any clothes... or in this case ,that their military really didn't have any guns, compared to America. That will change, and is changing, as the Chinese economy hits $2 trillion GDP, and heads for $4 trillion in about eight years... and then, if it can sustain that pace (doubtful, for an increasingly mature economy) for $8 trillion eight years after that. The American economy is currently about $11 trillion... and will keep growing, but at maybe %3, compared to China's %8. So it's not all that far off, that day when America ceases to be the world's biggest economy... unexpected eventualities not withstanding.
As I've said before, current China policy is predicated on the assumption that at some point, China will turn democratic, because autocratic systems just can't handle massive, modern economic systems. So it's a race, between the coming democracy, and China's military expansion, to see which one arrives first -- the democracy, or the point where China CAN win the war for Taiwan. The assumption being, of course, that a democratic China would not go to war over Taiwan...
So here's what I think is emerging -- a security relationship between America and Japan, and India. India's economy's still only about point seven of a trillion, but their military has in many ways better foundations than China's, and their technology is improving faster. Japan is casting off the old pacifism fast, and when you look at their region, it's not surprising. I'd guess they'll be a normal military power in less than a decade, and could even start doing some serious military R&D, and exporting weapons. Japan has about ten years to go until China overtakes them in GDP terms, but their technology edge will take way longer to catch.
It's not containment. Japan, America and India are all trading with China as fast as they can, and fuelling China's growth. That's a good thing. But it's also laying down limits. Okay, perhaps that IS a form of containment... but only in the sense that it's instructing an authoritarian power that any attempt to attack or strongarm one's democratic neighbors will cost them very dearly. And if certain western liberal types want to complain about that, well maybe they should move to China, and take up jobs managing China's many labour camps where the Chinese dissidents are kept, because their arguments don't rise much above that moral level.
There's a lot of debate from people saying that any attempt to 'contain' China is dangerous and counterproductive. In order to understand what the hell they're talking about, you have to ask what they mean by 'contain'.
Currently, there's a lot of criticism of US government policy to shore up military relations with Japan and India in particular, as well as strengthening various regional Asian relationships. The current US government's critics, predictably, accuse it of saber-rattling (do sabers rattle? Do cutlasses squeak?) Never mind that China has lined up missile batteries opposite Taiwan and periodically threatens to blow them all to hell if they don't vote for the right candidate in Taiwanese elections (oh if only China would have one of those...) once again all bad behavior of foreigners becomes America's fault, because that's more politically correct than blaming 1.3 billion Chinese for anything.
Firstly, I think the accusation of containment is silly, because it assumes that foreign policy is a zero-sum game. Maybe it was a hundred years ago, but in the era of globalisation, there's no longer any such thing. Military balance, or equilibrium, is not 'containment'. It's merely the warning of serious consequences for aggressive action. So far it's worked extremely well, and has in fact encouraged China to tone down its rhetoric significantly over Taiwan, for the simple reason that the Chinese leadership have been forced to realise that Taiwan plus America is a war they can't win. Yet.
There's plenty of South East Asian nations who are also quite pleased to be beneath America's security umbrella, where China is concerned. Some unlikely ones too, like Vietnam, who distrust China even more than China distrusts them. In fact, relations aren't real cozy all around the South China Sea, despite frequent plaudits for China's autocrats in the western media, lauding them for being so civiilised for not having killed anyone lately... a bit like patting Hannibal Lecter on the head and saying 'isn't Hannibal a good boy, he hasn't eaten ANYONE for weeks!'
So okay, that's overdoing it. But I liked the imagery.
The point is that much of the Chinese leadership's present pragmatism isn't praiseworthy enlightenment, it's simply that America called China's bluff, forcing the Chinese to realise that their emperor really didn't have any clothes... or in this case ,that their military really didn't have any guns, compared to America. That will change, and is changing, as the Chinese economy hits $2 trillion GDP, and heads for $4 trillion in about eight years... and then, if it can sustain that pace (doubtful, for an increasingly mature economy) for $8 trillion eight years after that. The American economy is currently about $11 trillion... and will keep growing, but at maybe %3, compared to China's %8. So it's not all that far off, that day when America ceases to be the world's biggest economy... unexpected eventualities not withstanding.
As I've said before, current China policy is predicated on the assumption that at some point, China will turn democratic, because autocratic systems just can't handle massive, modern economic systems. So it's a race, between the coming democracy, and China's military expansion, to see which one arrives first -- the democracy, or the point where China CAN win the war for Taiwan. The assumption being, of course, that a democratic China would not go to war over Taiwan...
So here's what I think is emerging -- a security relationship between America and Japan, and India. India's economy's still only about point seven of a trillion, but their military has in many ways better foundations than China's, and their technology is improving faster. Japan is casting off the old pacifism fast, and when you look at their region, it's not surprising. I'd guess they'll be a normal military power in less than a decade, and could even start doing some serious military R&D, and exporting weapons. Japan has about ten years to go until China overtakes them in GDP terms, but their technology edge will take way longer to catch.
It's not containment. Japan, America and India are all trading with China as fast as they can, and fuelling China's growth. That's a good thing. But it's also laying down limits. Okay, perhaps that IS a form of containment... but only in the sense that it's instructing an authoritarian power that any attempt to attack or strongarm one's democratic neighbors will cost them very dearly. And if certain western liberal types want to complain about that, well maybe they should move to China, and take up jobs managing China's many labour camps where the Chinese dissidents are kept, because their arguments don't rise much above that moral level.
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